Abstract
In this paper, we undertake a micro-level analysis of Kenya, in order to shed light on a macrolevel phenomenon: electoral violence. The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, to analyze whether political parties in Kenya employed illegal electioneering practices strategically before and after the 2007 General Elections. Second, to investigate whether the post-electoral violence that erupted once the Presidential results were announced affected people's ethnic identity, their support for democracy and the acceptability for the use of violence. Third, to link the micro-level findings with a deeper understanding of these issues at the general level, which should in turn feed into the debate on how the electoral process in Africa could be improved.
To explore these research questions two surveys were conducted, one just two weeks before the 2007 elections and a second one in the summer of 2008 re-interviewing the previous respondents.
Since the self-reported incidences of violence captured in the surveys might provide a partial picture of the incidence of violence at local level, external data sources are used to measure the death toll and number of injured people. These indicators were obtained from the Commission in Kenya in charge of investigating the 2008 post-electoral conflict (CIPEV) and were also estimated independently by monitoring the Kenyan media outlets (newspapers, radio and TV stations) on a daily basis over the period December 2007 -March 2008 . By triangulating the panel survey to these external data sources a comprehensive picture of the micro-dynamics of the post-electoral violence was built, allowing us to assess the consequences of the violence at the personal and small-area (district) levels.
3 ethnically diverse, a characteristic that makes it particularly vulnerable to violent conflict. Although previous studies have found that economic indicators, such as a fall in GDP, are more important determinants of civil conflict than ethnic diversity (Collier and Rohner 2008) , Kenya actually experienced its highest rates of economic growth ahead of the disputed election. Hence, the Kenyan case provides an example where weak electoral institutions and parties seeking political profit at the expense of instigating ethnic divisions can overturn democratic progress and lead to conflict, even in a phase of economic prosperity.
The paper continues as follows. Next section provides a brief overview of the institutional failures that led to the post-electoral violence. Section 3 describes the data sources used, as well as the instances in which political parties instigated violence and vote-buying. In section 4 we assess econometrically whether parties behaved strategically and the effects of being a victim of postelectoral violence. The last section presents the conclusions.
The Build up Towards Post-Electoral Violence
Kenya was once seen as beacon of peace, having transferred power peacefully from the long-ruling However, ethnicity, just like in the violent elections of the 1990s, turned out to be the main factor influencing the electoral behavior of citizens and politicians. The three main presidential candidates were overwhelmingly supported by people from their own ethnic groups: incumbent president Mwai Kibaki by the Kikuyus, Raila Odinga by the Luos and Kalonzo Muzyoka by the Kambas. Other ethnic groups that did not have a presidential candidate contending in the election also divided their support (see table 3 ).
Political parties relied on narrow sectarian agendas and conducted their campaigns in a confrontational manner, exploiting ethnic divisions (CIPEV 2008, p. 347-348) . Several communities reported the activities of organized gangs ahead of the election, and to have received hate campaigns via leaflets and SMS inciting ethnic violence (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012) . Despite the heated political campaigning, only a few incidences of pre-electoral violence were reported (41), and concentrated in the Molo district which tends to experience land disputes particularly during elections. Another key element that triggered the political crisis was that after early counts of the votes indicated that Odinga would win, the Electoral Commission, declared Kibaki the winner of the election and swore him immediately into office amid allegations of irregularities. A few days later, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission admitted that he had suffered immense pressure to announce the results despite not being sure who had won the elections. This was one of the multiple failures of the Electoral Commission and security forces, which fell short of preventing the instigation of violence by political actors and the widespread practices of vote-buying and intimidation.
A coalition government was agreed on February 28, 2008 after weeks of blood shed. Kibaki was to remain the elected President, while Muzyoka would become the Vice-President and Odinga the Prime Minister. Although the Kenyan coalition government has scored a major victory by reforming the constitution in 2010, the Kenyan judiciary system has failed up to-date to put on trial the alleged perpetrators of the post-electoral violence. Instead, it is the International Crime Court (ICC) that has decided to prosecute some of alleged perpetrators of violence, including a number of high-profile politicians for crimes against humanity (BBC 2011).
Despite gradually bringing perpetrators of violence to justice, the underlying behavior of political parties in terms of strategic vote-buying, violence instigation and their alleged links to organized gangs are to be fully understood.
Illegal Electoral Practices: Panel Data and External Sources
To assess the scope of electoral irregularities and the effects of post-electoral violence two nationally representative surveys are used, one conducted two weeks before the 2007 General Elections and a second one that revisited the previous respondents in August 2008. The pre-electoral survey is based 5 on a nationally and regionally representative sample of 1,207 individuals drawn from 77 out of 210 constituencies in Kenya with a margin of sampling error of +/-3 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. The sample captures the rural/urban split and its ethnic distribution is consistent with the most recent Kenyan census. The post-electoral survey re-interviewed 54.2 percent of previous respondents.
In order to make meaningful comparisons between the two surveys, the respondents from the preelectoral survey that could not be re-interviewed were replaced by new respondents with the same overall characteristics.
1 The main characteristics of the respondents are shown in the Appendix in Table ( A.1).
At the time of the pre-electoral survey, most respondents claimed they were registered voters and that planned to vote in the Presidential election (93% Figure 1 as the poll reported on 12 December) coincide with the voting projections made by the majority of other opinion polls and by a major exit poll conducted by the University of California, San Diego on December 27, 2007.
The majority of the pre-electoral survey respondents expected that the elections would be free and fair. ' Only a small group expected that the elections would not be free and fair in terms of the vote-count (6.35%), which turned to be one of the major issues marring the elections. Both the ODM and PNU were accused of stuffing ballots in their hotspots. According to the ECK results, the provinces of Central, Nyanza and the Rift Valley had a higher turnout out than the national average. However, given that these provinces had a lot to lose if their preferred candidate were not elected, this could explain to some extent the higher than average turnout. Although there are also some differences between the survey's intention to vote and the ECK results at provincial level (Table 2) , it is also hard to deduct from these comparisons whether there was any rigging and the extent of it.
Electoral Irregularities
Regardless of whether there was actually any issue with the tallying of the votes, perhaps a more important aspect is whether voters actually thought the election had been rigged. To assess this issue, the post-electoral survey asked: "Which presidential candidate do you think legitimately won the presidential election of 2007?". As shown in Table ( 3) the majority of the respondents (61.3%)
believed that Odinga won the election legitimately, while only 25 percent thought it was Kibaki and less than 0.1 percent believed it was Muzyoka. A further 13.5 percent of respondents was not sure which candidate had legitimately won the election.
Rigging was not the only irregularity surrounding the election. Threatening and vote-buying are not cheap activities, so it is not surprising that the ODM and the PNU, the parties with the biggest budgets, were the ones that appeared the most active. (Table 6 ).
According to the ICC the violence in the Rift Valley was strategically planned to attack supporters of President Kibaki after the election. In particular, the Kikuyus were chased out of the province as a revenge to the president for the irregularities in the election, and also because some took the opportunity to 'clean' their province from non-natives that moved there decades before through the government's land schemes. In retaliation, organized gangs like Mungiki and the police were given authorization to use excessive force to attack ODM supporters, which brought the second major spike of violence between 25 and 30 of January. Violence ceased soon after the power sharing agreement was reached on February 28.
The violence observed suggests that although some of it erupted spontaneously as a result of the belief that the election had been rigged, but there were also premeditated attacks, involving politicians, businessmen and others who enlisted criminal gangs even before the actual election (CIPEV 2008) . Thus, it is important to assess whether political actors instigated or orchestrated the violence strategically, targeting specific areas and voters.
Political Party's Strategic Behavior and the Effects of Violence
This section assesses two key features of the disputed elections. First, it analyses whether political actors used illegal electoral practices strategically, such as vote-buying, violence instigation, and rigging. Then the section explores the consequences of post-electoral violence on Kenyan's attitudes towards democracy, ethnic identity and the use of violence.
According to the literature, political parties wishing to maximize their profit may choose to employ illegal electoral strategies to advance their interests taking into account their budget constraints, the strength of electoral institutions, and carefully plan whether to rely on ( predicting that parties with a strong attachment to a particular group, an ethnic one for instance, will devote resources exclusively towards their supporters and not to swing voters. According to this model, trying to lure swing voters is a risky strategy since parties cannot be sure whether their offers will be effective. An alternative explanation for parties targeting their strongholds is given by Nitcher (2008) who finds that parties seeking to increase their turnout will seek to mobilize their own supporters, as what he defines 'turnout-buying'. In contrast, other theoretical models developed by Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Stokes (2005) suggest it is not an optimal strategy to devote resources exclusively to groups whose votes are already guaranteed. Instead, these models predict that political parties will target vote-buying towards 'moderate voters' who are relatively indifferent between the contending candidates, thus having a higher chance of being influenced.
In Kenya is possible that political parties might have devoted resources towards swing or moderate voters given that to win the presidential election, 25 percent of the vote must be secured in five out of the eight provinces. Otherwise, the election would have to go for a second round between the top two front runners. Nonetheless, parties might have had incentives to also devote resources to their hotspots given how closely contested the presidential election was, which makes the outcome more likely to depend on the actual turnout that each of the candidates would have. Thus, using the definition of Nitcher (2008) (2012) predicts, the EU observers reported the presidential turnout figures in Kibaki's strongholds to be suspiciously high, and mysteriously higher than the observed turnout of the MP elections held on the same day. However, the same problem was found in Odinga's strongholds (Rice 2008). Throup (2008) analyzing the irregularities of the electoral results reaches the conclusion that the ODM may be as guilty as the PNU party in the ballot stuffing. In anticipation that the election was going to be close, both parties probably resorted to the stuffing of ballots as a precautionary measure, and they would have found it easier in their own hotspots where they would face less resistance from local people and they could also simply inflate the turnout of their ethnicsupporters.
Since all the major parties contending in the Kenyan presidential election were recently created, they don't have previous electoral results to gauge the local area's political loyalties.
Nonetheless, all the opinion polls conducted ahead of the election showed that the electorate was clearly divided on ethnic terms. Hence, it would have been a relatively easy task for parties to identify which areas they were more likely to win, and within each area who the potential voters were that could be targeted for either vote-buying or intimidating. Based on the existing theories, the following four hypotheses will be tested.
Hypothesis 1: The ODM and PNU are more likely to devote resources to 'turnout-buying' in their own hotspots as a strategy to mobilize their own supporters.
Hypothesis 2: The ODM and PNU devoted resources to 'vote-buying' targeted people perceived to be 'swing or moderate' voters and areas with less closely contested elections.
Hypothesis 3: Political actors were more likely to instigate violence in areas with more closely contested elections, targeting particularly the 'swing or moderate' voters.
in turnouts in the presidential and MP elections than other areas.
Strategic Behavior of Political Parties
To analyze whether there was any strategic use of illegal electoral practices a series of probit models are estimated, based on equation (1). The dependent variable is whether the respondent reported to have suffered from an illegal electoral practice. The independent variables used are the respondent's ethnic origin and wealth (X ic ) and the political characteristics of the constituency c where the respondent i was living in 2007 (POL ic ).
Pr(suffered illegal electoral practice=1)=I(X ic ȕ+POL ic į) eq. (1) The marginal effects of the probit models are reported in Table (7) . In column (1) of this Table, the dependent variable is whether the respondents received an offer for their vote directly from the PNU party ahead of the election. In column (2) the dependent variable is whether the offer came from the ODM party. The focus is exclusively on these two parties because they accounted for 83 percent of all the vote-buying offers that the respondents reported during the 2007 campaign.
Respondents in PNU and ODM hotspots had the same probability of having received an offer for their votes from either party. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported. Since the PNU, the ODM and the ODM-K were newly created parties for the 2007 elections, it is not possible to assess from previous electoral results in which areas these parties had more influence. So the parties' hotspots were identified based on the ethnic composition of the constituency. For instance, the ethnic hotspots of the ODM are defined as those constituencies where the majority of the population is of Luo, Luhya or Kalenjin origin, groups which overwhelmingly supported this party. The ethnic hotspots of the PNU are the constituencies where the majority of people are Kikuyos and Merus, and the ethnic hotspots of the ODM-K are where the people are predominantly Kambas.
However, neither of the two parties focused their vote-buying exclusively on their respective hotspots. Supporting hypothesis 2, the PNU used vote-buying in constituencies which had less closely contested presidential elections, regardless of which presidential candidate was in the lead. In contrast the ODM focused its vote-buying in the less contested areas, but only where the ODM had the advantage in voter's preference over the PNU. The degree of competitiveness was estimated as the raw difference in the share of the intention to vote between the first and second most preferred presidential candidate based on how the respondents claimed they would vote in the elections. The differences in vote-buying could also suggest that the PNU targeted less closely contested areas to convey to these areas that the party would offer patronage goods in the future, regardless of their voter's preferences. In contrast, the ODM could have targeted areas where they had less competition to strengthen the signal that it would channel patronage resources to its supporters if the party was elected.
Both parties targeted specific ethnic groups within each area, which could be perceived as swing or moderate voters, supporting hypothesis 2 as well. The PNU targeted the Kissis, which had a relatively lower support for the ODM (64.9%). 3 The ODM targeted the Merus, which was one of the main supporters of the PNU party. Since there was no Meru nominee running for the Presidency or Vice-Presidency in the PNU, perhaps they could have been more easily persuaded to switch their alliance than the Kikuyos. Although the ODM rarely targeted Kikuyos for vote-buying, the Kalenjin and Mijikenda were even less likely to be targeted for vote-buying than the Kikuyos.
A key difference in the vote-buying strategies of the two parties was the type of voter targeted.
One could argue that poorer voters could have been perceived as potential 'swing or moderate voters' if presented with gifts or signals of future patronage that they would value more than wealthier voters.
Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that the ODM targeted the wealthier respondents, perhaps thinking that their manifesto had already earned the support of the poor, whereas the PNU did not discriminate voters by wealth. 4 This suggest that although the ODM focused on areas where it already had an advantage in the preference of the voters, the type of individuals targeted were those which were perceived to need further convincing to move away from the PNU, whose presidential candidate, Kibaki, was known to have done little to re-distribute wealth from the rich to the poor.
We find plenty evidence to support hypothesis 3. For instance, both the PNU and the ODM seem to have chosen strategically the areas and people to threaten (Columns 3 and 4), although they threaten a relatively few people (60 in our sample). Both parties focused their threats in closely contested areas and where they had an advantage over their rival, but they were less likely to threaten members of their own ethnic group. For instance, the ODM was less likely to target the Luo, Luhya, Kissi and Kalenjin than the Kikuyu. The PNU was less likely to threaten the Kissis, which was the group the PNU was trying to lure via vote-buying. Another distinctive feature was that the PNU was also more likely to threaten in the ethnic hotspot of the ODM than in their own hotspot.
The instigation of violence by political actors was one of the most commonly reported illegal activities, both before and after the elections. Column (5) shows the probability of the respondent having reported that politicians instigated violence in their community before the elections, whilst column (6) shows the same issue but after the election. In neither of these two cases did the survey ask which specific candidates or parties were instigating the violence. Residents living in areas with more closely contested presidential elections were more likely to report politicians instigating violence in their areas, both before and after the elections. There were however key differences in the areas and respondents that were targeted before and after the elections.
Before the elections, respondents living in ODM hotspots were less likely to report politicians instigating violence in their communities than those living in the hotspots of the PNU. However, after 12 the elections the ODM and PNU hotspots reported equally that political actors instigated people to use violence.
The involvement of organized gangs, allegedly hired by political actors, has been much discussed as playing a central role in the post-electoral violence. Columns (7) and (8) show that before the elections respondents living in the hotspot of the ODM were equally likely to have heard of gangs operating in their areas as those living in PNU hotspots. However, the Luhyas were more likely to have heard of gangs operating in their area than the Kikuyos. Also wealthier respondents were more likely to have reported gangs operating in their areas before, but not after the election.
After the elections, gangs were reported more by people living in constituencies where the elections had been more closely contested, and again by those of Luhya ethnic origin. Columns (9) and (10) show that people reported the Mungiki gang operating more in constituencies which had closely contested presidential elections.
In sum, it seems that politicians acted strategically in their use of vote-buying as well as in the direct and indirect instigation of violence. The degree of competition in local elections affected the specific type of strategy adopted. The closely contested areas were more likely to report the instigation of violence. In contrast, the areas with less contested elections experienced more vote-buying. Both parties tried to lure support away from their political rivals. We found no evidence that the respondents that received an offer for their vote before the elections were threatened by the same party after the elections.
To finalize the inquiry we focus on the allegations of electoral fraud. Column (11) tests hypothesis 4, which suggests that political parties were more likely to have miscounted the votes in ODM and PNU areas. To test this hypothesis, an OLS regression is estimated, using as the dependent variable the raw difference between the official turnout in the presidential election and the turnout in the MPs elections at constituency level. The explanatory variables used in this model are how closely contested the presidential election was according to the pre-electoral survey, as well as whether the constituency was the hotspot of a particular party in terms of ethnic composition terms. Since elections were held in 76 out of the 77 constituencies sampled, the model is ran only for these areas.
The results suggest that the hotspots of the PNU and ODM were as likely to have had differences in turnout in the presidential and MP elections, as hypothesis 4 predicts. The hotspots of the ODM-K and other parties were less likely to have differences in turnouts than the PNU hotspots.
However, how closely contested the election was did not affect the observed differences in voter turnout between the presidential and MP elections, suggesting that ballot boxes for the presidential election might have been inflated in the hotspots of the two main parties.
Robustness checks
One issue of concern is the likely endogeneity between the measured degree of electoral competition and the areas targeted for vote-buying, instigation of violence or rigging. To assess the robustness of 13 the results all the regressions were re-run using instrumental variables (regional and district indicators)
to deal with the likely endogeneity in the variable measuring the degree of competition. The results
(not included here) in terms of signs and significance levels did not change.
It was also explored whether the probability of reporting vote-buying, threats and instigation of violence was affected by the party affiliation of the incumbent local MP. The party affiliation of the MP did not matter in any of the cases explored, hence the results were not reported in Table ( (2) where Y it denotes the outcome in treatment status i and period t. A person in state i=1 is a treated unit if exposed to violence. T= {0,1} is the indicator of exposure to violence, X is the multi-dimensional vector of individual and area characteristics before the violence and p(X) is the propensity score.
The propensity score matching denotes the conditional probability of receiving a treatment, in this case violence, given the pre-treatment characteristics, as shown in equation (3). The score is obtained using the non-parametric Kernel-method selecting those which satisfied the balancing hypothesis, which ensures that the distribution of characteristics X is the same for those exposed to violence and those who were not. The variables used to estimate the propensity score matching are the respondent's ethnicity, education, age, whether they had experienced land disputes before the 2007 constituency where the respondent was living before the outbreaks of post-electoral violence.
p(X)ŁPr{T=1|X}=E{T|X} eq. (3)
In regression form the difference-in-difference estimator can be expressed as in equation (4) People could have been affected by violence in different ways. First, they could have been the direct recipients of the violence, for instance in terms of personal injury or destruction of property. In addition, they could have been affected by violence by being unable to carry out with their day to day business activities losing earnings or their jobs. Even if they were lucky enough to escape from these instances of violence, they could have changed their attitudes towards the role of elections and ethnopolitics, simply by living in an area that was exposed to violence. Three proxies were used to assess whether the survey respondent was a victim of post-electoral violence or exposed to this violence.
The first proxy, victims of direct violence, captures whether the respondent was the direct recipient of post-electoral violence if the respondent answered positively to the following question
'Were you personally affected in the outbreaks of violence after 2007 in any of the following ways?: personal injury, damage to your personal property, the destruction of your home, being forced to leave your home, the destruction of your business or forced to leave your land because of electoral
conflict'. The change in opinions among these victims of violence are compared to those respondents that did not report to have suffered from any of these instances of violence and who were living in areas that were not exposed to violence. The areas that were not exposed to violence are identified as the districts which did not report people being injured or killed as a direct effect of the post-electoral violence according to the CIPEV report. respondents that did not report to have suffered from any of these instances of violence and who were living in areas that were not exposed to violence.
The third proxy compares people who were not victims of direct or secondary violence, but who were living in districts exposed to violence according to the CIPEV report. The change in opinions among this group are compared to those who did not experience violence, and who were living in districts that did not experience violence. among those affected by violence -either directly, in economic terms or in areas exposed to violence-, this increased level of dissatisfaction cannot be attributed alone to the direct experience of violence or to having lived in a district that was exposed to violence. Unsurprisingly therefore, the difference-indifference coefficients are not statistically significant for any of the three proxies used.
Columns (4) to (6) . Although these perceptions also increased among the victims or in areas exposed to violence, this increase was roughly half that of non-victims. In other words, the victims or those in areas exposed to violence are more likely to prefer elections than the non-victims, despite elections sometimes producing bad results.
Columns (7) to (9) assess the change in support for the statement: "Elections and the National Assembly should be abolished, so that the president can decide everything". There was no change in the support for this statement among those not affected and in areas not exposed to violence (coefficient year 2008). In contrast, the victims of violence or in areas exposed to violence are less likely to agree with this statement after the elections. This suggests that among those who were affected by violence, despite their struggles, they still think it is worth choosing their leaders by some means, instead of letting their president decide everything, as used to be the case in Kenya before the multi-party elections were re-introduced in 1991.
Columns (10) to (12) focus on the change in the perception that "Competition between political parties leads to violent conflict". The great majority of respondents, regardless of whether they were affected or not by violence held this perception before the election (90%), and it did not change after the election. This perception was almost halved after the elections. In contrast, for the victims of violence, there was an increase in the percentage of those who identified in ethnic terms, for all the three proxies of violence used, thus the difference-in-difference estimator is positive and statistically significant.
Columns (4) to (6) show the changes in the support for the statement "parties should not be allowed to form on a basis of tribe or religion". Before the elections, about 66 percent of those not affected or in areas not exposed to violence agreed with the statement, and there was no change after the elections. In contrast, the victims of violence or in areas exposed to violence increased their support for the above statement, despite identifying more in ethnic terms after the disputed elections.
After the elections, the ethnicity of politicians was still very influential on which party respondents like the least or the most. Columns (7) and (9) show the changes in the support for the statement "In deciding which party you most dislike, do you consider the ethnic or regional origin of the party's leader?". Before the elections, about 78 percent of those not affected or in areas not exposed to violence agreed that they considered the attributes of ethnicity or regional origin. After the election, this perception increased slightly and in the same proportion among both the victims and non-victims of violence, hence the difference-in-difference estimator is not statistically significant.
Similarly, columns (10) and (12) show the change to: "In deciding which party you most like, do you consider the ethnic or regional origin of the party's leader?". Before the elections roughly half of those not affected or in areas not exposed to post-electoral violence agreed that they consider the ethnicity or regional origin of the party leader's ethnicity. After the election, there was a 13 percentage point increase among those who considered the party leader's ethnicity or origin, and this change was roughly the same among those who experienced only physical violence or were exposed to violence.
The only exception was the victims of physical and economic violence, among which the differencein-difference estimator shows a reduction, albeit small (coefficient 0.088). Table ( Columns (7) to (9) show that having been a victim of electoral violence either physical or economic, increased the probability of agreeing with "If you were a victim of a violent crime, you would find another way to deal with the matter instead of calling the police". Lastly, columns (10) and (12) 
Conclusions and Implications
This article sought to test whether political parties used illegal electoral practices strategically in the caused by the prevailing ethno-political system. All political parties would be better off financially if no-one buys votes, making more resources available for the provision of public goods. However, as
Kramon (2011) argues, given that no politician can commit to not buying votes, the expensive dominant strategy is to vote-buy, despite the effectiveness of vote buying being reduced by all parties doing the same. In Kenya, the observed behavior of ethnic-voting is driven by the expectations that threats, more instigation of violence, and reported a higher incidence of gangs operating in their areas with political links both before and after the elections. The reason political actors targeted these areas was to prevent rival supporters from voting, using these tactics as a measure of 'damage control'.
These practices were widespread and not limited to a specific party. However, organized gangs, with alleged links to the PNU, targeted specific ethnic groups such as the Luhyas supporting the ODM.
This finding is consistent with the predictions of Collier and Vicente (2012) , who suggest that if the challenger party has a large support base, the incumbent party will intimidate the challenger's moderate supporters, as a repression tactic for them not to vote. The results however fill the gap in the existing theoretical literature as to what type of intimidation tactics are used. Both parties used predominantly indirect intimidation tactics by instigating people to be violent through sectarian campaigns and gangs, but avoided making direct-threats. A potential reason for these findings, is the fact that both parties had a chance to win the elections, and potentially therefore an interest in not discrediting the electoral process entirely and making themselves directly accountable for the violence.
Third, more electoral irregularities were observed in the hotspots of the two main political parties, corroborating the hypothesis of Collier and Vicente (2012) that the incumbent party will seek to vote-buy and rig in its own hotspots. However, the Kenyan case also provides evidence that a strong challenger party will also resort to rigging if the competition is close, and the incumbent candidate is expected to rig.
The article also analyzed the changes in Kenyan's views after the post-electoral violence. The electoral ordeal deepened the divisions on how the country should be run. Those not affected by violence increased their desire for abolishing elections altogether. In contrast, the victims of violence at personal level would prefer not allowing parties to align on the basis of ethnicity or religion.
Paradoxically though among these victims of violence, more identify in ethnic terms, and still use the ethnicity of the candidates to gauge which party to support. Previous research has found that ethnic identity in African countries is strengthened right before the elections, as political parties mobilize voters in that way to claim power, land and wealth (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010; Lynch 2011).
This article found that violence not only reinforced ethnic identity, but also the acceptability of the use of violence among the victims of violence.
Several of the effects of violence discussed in this article support the findings of previous studies suggesting that citizens' political attitudes respond to violence, especially in new or emerging democracies. For instance, Booth and Richard (1998, 2000) provide evidence for Central America, a region exposed to political violence during the 1980s and 1990s, showing that violence increased the alienation from elections and reduced several types of political participation. Similar to this article, the authors also found that violence can produce 'unintended consequences' for those who employed it, as victims of violence increased their willingness to organize and use violence for example to overthrow governments. Source: Author's pre-electoral survey. Source: Author's pre-electoral survey and Kenyan Electoral Commission. Source: Author's electoral surveys. 3 One of the possible reasons why the Luhyas were not targeted for vote-buying with more intensity than other groups could be that both the ODM and the PNU had tried to secure the affiliations of this group by pledging a vice-presidency to a Luhya candidate.
4 Wealth levels were assessed by constructing a asset index based on the responses to the question: "from the following list which of these things does your household own?". The list of things includes 15 possible durable assets, which were used to construct a normalized wealth-asset index ranging from 0 to 1 (owns all 15 listed assets: book, radio, television, bicycle, motor vehicle, house, oven, fridge, washing machine, land telephone, land, cattle, computer and mobile phones).
5 All the respondents who reported to have experienced direct effects of violence were living in the districts that CIPEV identified with either people being injured or killed as direct effect of post-electoral violence.
